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les Nouvelles January 2024 Article of the Month:
Public And Private Initiatives To Accelerate The Development And Diffusion Of Green Tech Part I

Part II

Aileen M. SanguirAileen M. Sanguir*

IPR and Licensing Manager
Ericsson AB
Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract

Global average temperature increase is still likely to exceed 1.5ºC despite State commitments, and we can see its disastrous effects through extreme weather phenomena around the world. Systems should be overhauled to combat climate change, and massive investment
in green technology is crucial for this.

Patents incentivize investment in green tech by allowing patentees to protect investments, leverage for cross-licensing, generate royalties, and attract funding. Public initiatives are equally necessary to accelerate development and diffusion, and some measures adopted are fast-tracking patent applications, subsidies, and tax incentives. Some regional initiatives, e.g., the EU Emissions Trading System and the International Solar Alliance, are also in place to aid in the zero-carbon transition. As for the private sector, some are moving towards a circular economy, aiming to increase the use of renewable materials. Other innovative approaches to boost green tech are open-source software, platforms for collaboration (e.g., WIPO Green), and standardization. Open source allows different entities to integrate green tech products. Standardization involves the development of technical specifications for products and processes, aimed at interoperability and minimum performance levels. It has driven innovation in the mobile telecommunications, consumer electronics, automotive, and electricity industries. Standardizing green tech solutions may be beneficial, including in the energy,
manufacturing, and transport sectors.

Climate change requires a fundamental re-orientation of existing structures. For this, public and private efforts should be channeled towards green tech development and diffusion, supported by robust patent policy, and global regulatory, trade, and financial regimes conducive
to investment and innovation.

I. Introduction

In the Paris Agreement of 2015,1 196 Member States2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) bound themselves to certain obligations, one of the goals being to limit the increase in global average temperature to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels.3 To the casual reader, 1.5ºC may not seem large—but the rise in temperature of almost one degree at present has already drastically altered human and natural systems, leading to sea level rise, biodiversity loss, and extreme weather such as droughts
and floods.4

Indeed, 2022 has witnessed remarkable weather occurrences all over the world. Last summer, Pakistan recorded its worst flooding in at least a decade.5 From June to August, Pakistan received 190 percent of its annual normal rainfall, and there have been 1,160 deaths and 3,500 injuries as a consequence of the devastating floods.6 Researchers say that last summer’s monsoon
season was intensified by climate change.7

On the other end of the weather spectrum, the Horn of Africa has been experiencing one of the longest and most severe droughts towards the end of 2022.8 This is causing food insecurity for over 21 million people in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.9 The four consecutive dry rainy seasons have been correlated to human-induced warming, Indian Ocean sea surface temperatures, and La Niña.10. Similarly, drought and severe heat waves have hit Europe, with wildfires occurring in Portugal, France, Italy, and Romania in August.11 This negatively impacted the crop yield and Europe’s energy crisis, hindering hydropower generation and the normal functioning
of nuclear plants.12

Despite lying in another continent, the United States is not insulated from the effects of sea level and temperature rise. In 2022, California experienced its third year of severe drought and the driest on record as part of a climate-change fueled “megadrought.”13 The rising temperatures are adversely affecting the region’s water supply.14 In South America, parts of Argentina, Bolivia, central Chile, and most of Paraguay and Uruguay experienced two consecutive heatwaves in late November and early December 2022, reaching record-breaking
temperatures.15

The UK was also hit with severe drought, with its highest temperature recorded at 40.3ºC on the 28th of July.16 This caused fires to break out and disrupted rail transport.17 All of these events glaringly show the
impacts of climate change in every region of the world.

Against this backdrop, the United Nations’ annual global climate change summit “Conference of the Parties” was held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in November 2022 (COP27).18 In COP27, countries reaffirmed their commitment to limit global temperature rise to 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels, following the Paris Agreement in 2015.19 Among the decisions reached in COP27 is the creation of a specific fund for loss and damage for developing countries stricken by climate disasters.20 Other highlights include the creation of the Sharm el-Sheikh Adaptation Agenda, with the primary aim of developing resiliency-building projects, and nations’ agreement to provide additional funding for the UN’s Adaptation Fund, intended to help communities
adapt to climate change.21

Steps taken on a national and regional scale include the U.S. passing new laws confronting climate change, including a bill that aims to make green energy the default in major sectors like electricity, transport, and industry.22 Australia submitted increased targets for the reduction of its emissions to the UN, from its previous target of 26 percent to 43 percent by 2030.23 As for the European Union, it targets to raise its share of renewable energy from 40 percent to 45 percent by 2030,
encapsulated in the REPowerEU plan.24

That said, it was noted that progress since COP26 has been slow due to the global energy and financial crises.25 In addition, the COP 27 decision text does not include language phasing out fossil fuels, and in that
sense, it does not effectively limit warming.26

The foregoing events show the need not only to mitigate the environmental damage already caused, but also to overhaul and adapt systems and processes to operate sustainably. The development and use of new technology are crucial for this, and society must consider environmental objectives when developing and choosing new technologies.27 The development of climate policy requires large investments in technology and implementation in all sectors, e.g., transport, construction, energy, agriculture, shipping, tourism, etc.28 To illustrate, it has been estimated that an additional USD $44 trillion of investment would be needed to decarbonize energy systems by 2050 to meet global climate targets.29 To achieve green growth, the participation of different private and public actors and institutions within the economy—consumers, firms, policymakers—is required in addition to substantial investments. 30 In other words, the planet urgently needs
a successful green tech plan.

This paper, divided into two parts, analyzes how public, private and hybrid initiatives toward green technologies could accelerate the development of cutting-edge solutions for the purpose of lessening the impact of climate change. This first part attempts to define green technology and discusses the role of patents in green tech development and identifies some public initiatives
in support of this development.

II. What is Green Tech?

Green technology (also known as green tech) is broadly one that enables users to promote environmental sustainability while maintaining economic growth.31 One example is climate change mitigation technologies (CCMT) such as carbon capture and storage32 or radiative cooling.33 It bears noting however, that there is no uniform definition for green tech. Instead, different terms are used in literature, although all are aimed at
similar objectives.

For example, the United Nations has defined “environmentally- sound technologies (EST)” as those that “protect the environment, are less polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner than the technologies for which they were substitutes.”34 This definition has likewise been cited by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO).35

From a patent point of view, the European Patent Office (EPO) in 2010 established a dedicated tagging scheme to identify applications that cover technologies involving climate change mitigation,36 known as “Y02/ Y04S.”37 Whenever a document concerning sustainable technology is added to its databases, the EPO assigns either a Y02 (for CCMT) or Y04S (for smart grids38) symbol.39 The EPO describes CCMT as technology focused on “controlling, reducing or preventing the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, as covered by the Kyoto Protocol.”40 Nonetheless, the EPO has clarified that the Y02/Y04S scheme is based on an ad hoc definition of “green” and neither sets an official definition
for the term nor certifies technologies as green.41

In sum, there is no official definition of green technology. To date, it remains unclear which technologies would specifically be considered green or not.42 As for the private sector, it has been observed that companies pay little attention to green tech definitions, but rather focus their efforts on the development and assessment of the quality of technologies for patenting purposes.43 Given this patent focus, it would be useful to evaluate the role patents play not only in the development of technology
in general, but also of green tech in particular.

III. Role of Patents

Patents have been key for the growth of the innovation ecosystem and will continue to play a vital role in incentivizing the development of green technologies. By granting a limited period of exclusivity, patents allow inventors to obtain some of the social value of their discoveries while providing incentives for continued investment in research and development (R&D). 44 In addition, patents facilitate technology transfers and collaboration in different industries, allow companies to focus their R&D efforts towards new and unpatented ideas, and enable such innovative ideas to
reach society faster.45

This is especially true for small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), which normally have more flexibility to innovate and can rely on patents when facing larger players, both to protect their technologies and to have avenues for cross-licensing.46 Nonetheless, a strong patent portfolio is also important for large established companies, as a way of protecting their investments, establishing a competitive advantage in the market, as leverage for cross-licensing, and as a
source of licensing royalties.47

As for academic and research institutions, patents allow them to “transform their innovations into licensing income streams,” which could in turn fund future research.48 The foregoing is true not only in developed countries, but also in emerging economies, where a strong intellectual property (IP) rights system would help attract foreign investors to partner with local entities, aiding in the introduction of new technologies
and in the promotion of social and economic growth.49

IP rights, including patents, also play a key role for obtaining financing or capital, especially for SMEs.50 Quality patents help businesses send a positive signal to possible collaborators and investors regarding the value of their inventions.51 Indeed, it has been observed that effective IP protection is a precondition before most private
funding becomes available.52

Regarding green tech in particular, the publication of patent applications may serve as a catalyst for technology- centric cooperative arrangements such as acquisitions, partnerships, and licensing.53 Perhaps this is why innovation in green tech is measured by some through the number of patent applications.54 Indeed, patent data has been used to provide an overview of global inventiveness in CCMTs.55 Moreover, a strong patent portfolio could be essential for green tech SMEs to attract venture capitalists, which, beyond assessing the value of technology, would also consider whether there
is adequate protection against “free-riding.”56

Without patent protection, firms would either have no incentive to continue innovating or would likely direct their R&D funds into technologies protectable under trade secrets.57 This, in turn, would prevent market participants from building on existing technology and stifle the development of an open innovation58 culture. Firms would then tend to restrict access to competitively relevant information as a form of self-help to substitute for IP protection.59 Further, there is evidence that inadequate IP protection hinders technology diffusion.60 This is because the patent system requires and incentivizes the publication of key results and scientific data, which enables further innovation and the development of new and derived products.61 Specifically on the development of green technologies, it has been opined that “[g]iven the complexity of the technology involved and the global nature of climate change, open innovation
is especially relevant for environmental innovation.”62

Despite the foregoing advantages, some have raised concerns that patents allow their holders to charge users higher prices, and that the benefits derived from some patented technologies are unclear or are difficult to measure.63 In the same vein, some believe that the market and pricing power conferred by IP protection could hinder the diffusion of technologies whose creation IP is meant to encourage, particularly if prices of products or license fees for patented technology are prohibitive.64 If there is a lack of access, it is argued that IP protection may hinder subsequent innovators from
building on protected technologies.65

The foregoing criticisms may not be entirely applicable to green tech. It should be noted, in this regard, that patents of most basic CCMTs have already expired, and the technologies have become publicly available and are widely used, e.g., wind turbines and photovoltaic cells.66 In addition, green tech patents typically involve incremental improvements or additional features of existing solutions.67 Any perceived negative impact resulting from patents may thus be overstated. For these reasons, the arguments against patent protection might not outweigh its advantages in terms of green tech development.

Thus, patent protection remains crucial to incentivize the private sector to invest in and develop green technologies. However, additional public initiatives are equally necessary for the development and diffusion of such technologies because diffusion requires considerable financing, physical infrastructure, incentive policies, and legal safeguards that foster investment.68 Consequently, beyond patent policy, global regulatory, trade, and financial regimes should be put in place to enable investment, innovation, and technology development and uptake.69 It is only through these that private commitment to green tech can be secured and sustained.70 Some of these initiatives, the private efforts they have spurred, and other mechanisms that could be adopted to complement and/or enhance their effectiveness,
shall be discussed in the next sections.

IV. Public, Private, and Hybrid Initiatives

1. Public Initiatives

Transnational or government authorities can promote the development and diffusion of green tech by establishing market-based national (or regional) systems of innovation.71 Some options available for this purpose are: 1) carbon pricing, 2) subsidies, 3) funding grants, and 4) public-private partnerships.72 Policy could also spur innovation by providing incentives for collaborative arrangements and creating networks for information transfer.73 The key, in this regard, is to find the right balance between technology policy (whose role is to facilitate and incentivize the development of green tech)74 and environmental policy (aimed at encouraging the diffusion of the technologies developed).75 In finding this balance, policymakers should carefully study the conditions of the country (local context) and the industry at which the
regulations are aimed.76

a) National Initiatives

Some examples of options implemented on a national level—fast-tracking of patent applications, funding
grants, and tax incentives—are discussed in this section.

Accelerated Processing of Patent Applications

Recognizing the value of patent protection, some countries have initiated programs that permit the faster examination of patent applications related to green tech. For example, since 2011, the Canadian IP Office has permitted the submission of requests at no cost for the faster processing of green technology, i.e., those that if commercialized would help “resolve or mitigate environmental impacts or conserve the natural environment and resources.”77 Once a request is processed, a first office action can be expected after three months as compared to 13 months under the normal process.78 It has been observed that in practice, it takes as little as two to four weeks from processing of the request for applicants to receive a first office action,79 and that the patent grant rate is remarkably high—around 88 percent of the applications filed through the accelerated
process in 2018 have been granted as of June 2021.80

Similar acceleration programs are in place in the UK (introduced in 2009),81 Japan (green tech made eligible in 2009),82 Australia (2009),83 Israel (2009),84 South Korea (2009),85 Brazil (piloted in 2012 and upgraded in 2020),86 China (2012),87 and Taiwan (green energy tech made eligible in 2014).88 Despite the availability of these programs, only a small percentage of green patents applicants opt to request accelerated examination. 89 There may be several reasons for this, including lack of awareness of the acceleration programs,90 or a business strategic decision. An applicant may even wish to delay the patent grant when the market is not mature enough or the company cannot immediately commercialize the technology, when product design has not been finalized so it would be beneficial to have flexibility in amending the patent claims, or to prevent
the exposure of their R&D to competitors.91

That said, the faster grant of patents also offers various advantages, including ease in raising capital (as earlier discussed), possibilities for licensing, and having the capacity to commence legal actions for infringement.92 Indeed, fast-tracking programs seem appealing to startup green tech companies engaged in raising capital but still generating small revenue,93 proving the point on the crucial role of patents for start-ups wishing to obtain
support for their innovative technologies.

One of the main objectives of these fast patent granting programs is to speed up the diffusion of green tech knowledge in the economy.94 Although their long-term results remain to be seen, the programs seem to be effective at first glance.95 Patent citations96 show that green tech fast-tracking programs appear to “accelerate the diffusion of knowledge in green [tech] in the short run—i.e., during the first years following the publication
of the patents.”97

Government Funding and Financial Support

Public funding for environmental R&D, especially at the pre-commercial stage, may play a crucial role in making up for insufficient investment by private companies. 98 Eco-innovation activity requires at least some public funding because green tech is less competitive than alternatives, and the effects of regulation and other public policy mechanisms are uncertain.99 Funding is particularly important for SMEs, which often neither have enough financial resources nor other assets to use
as collateral.100

In the United States, for example, there is a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program and one of the participating federal agencies is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).101 EPA’s SBIR focuses on the areas of “clean and safe water, air quality, land revitalization, homeland security, sustainable materials management and safer chemicals.”102 Every year, EPA solicits research proposals on specific topics and selects companies for the award of research grants.103 The SBIR Program has two phases: Phase I entitles awardees to USD $100,000 for six months to come up with a “proof of concept” of the proposed technology, while Phase II awards USD $400,000 for the further development and
commercialization of technology.104

The EPA SBIR aims to “foster game-changers that reduce or eliminate pollution” as opposed to technology aimed at cleaning up or containment systems.105 Some companies whose research and products have been funded by the EPA under the SBIR Program are AethLabs, KWJ Engineering, and Intellisense Systems, Inc., all involved in developing sensor technology for monitoring air quality during fire events.106 This is particularly relevant given the prevalence of wildfires in
the United States in recent years.

Other examples of financial support can be found in Brazil, where a subsidized credit program focused on innovation was launched in 2013, administered jointly by the Brazilian Innovation Agency (Finep) and the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES).107 Further, the Brazilian Company for Industrial Research and Innovation was created in 2014, which administers a fund allowing accredited research institutions working on technological projects to receive public subsidies covering up to a third of their total costs.108 It was reported that the innovation credit programs of Finep and BNDES funded around U.S. $2
billion worth of new contracts in 2018.109

The ability of government financial support to effectively spur green tech innovation depends on several factors, including the gap between the financing required and the public funding available, the capacity of the technology to compete for public funds with competing projects, the probability of failure or success, and the type of investor involved.110 Still, access to public funding or fiscal incentives has empirically been found to have a positive effect on the development of eco-innovations, supporting the view that direct public intervention plays an important role in transitioning to
a low-carbon economy.111

Tax Incentives

Aside from direct grants/subsidies, some governments have legislated to grant tax incentives for engaging in R&D in innovative technologies. For example, the UK has had R&D reliefs in place since 2000,112 where eligible companies can avail of tax deductions (of up to 230 percent of qualifying costs for SMEs) for taking part in a “specific project to make an advance in science or technology.”113 Aside from the UK, tax relief for R&D expenditures are in place in 34 out of 38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries,
22 out of 27 EU countries, and others.114

On the effectiveness of these incentives, an empirical study of the UK scheme was conducted (covering 2008- 2015) by examining the effect of an increase in thresholds for determining whether an entity qualifies as an SME (and is thus entitled to higher tax deductions).115 The results of the study showed that there was a significant increase in patenting and R&D activity following the implementation of the policy, and this supports the view that it has a positive effect on innovation.116 It was further observed that the R&D tax policy not only stimulates innovation of firms that directly benefit from the
incentives, but also has spillover effects for other firms.117

b) Regional Initiatives and Inter-state Cooperation

Given the magnitude and pervasive effect of climate change, initiatives have unsurprisingly transcended national borders and spurred regional and even international collaborations. Indeed, cross-country cooperation in respect of CCMT has increased over time.118 For example, the EU Emissions Trading System and the International Solar Alliance, discussed below, are both targeted towards emission reduction and a shift to environmentally
friendly energy sources.

EU Emissions Trading System

Set up in 2005, the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) has been referred to as “a cornerstone of the EU’s policy to combat climate change” and “the world’s first major carbon market.”119 It is a “cap-and-trade” system, which means that it imposes a cap on the total volume of greenhouse gas emissions of identified sectors accounting for most of the emissions within the EU (e.g., energy-intensive industry sectors and commercial aviation120), and allows the trading of emission allowances121 so that industry players themselves can allocate the credits to those that expect to have more emissions. An allowance represents a right to “emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified period” and is transferable in accordance with the provisions of the relevant EU directives.122 These allowances or permits have been referred to as the “currency in carbon markets.”123 The level of the cap dictates the number of allowances made available in the system and is designed
to decrease annually starting in 2013.124

An enterprise covered by the ETS and which has obtained a greenhouse gas emissions permit is obliged to surrender a total number of allowances per year that corresponds to its total emissions for the same calendar year.125 Allowances are either sold (usually through auction) or given for free to certain participants, in sectors where the risk is high that production would be shifted elsewhere if the full cost of allowances is shouldered by the enterprises.126 In the event an enterprise does not have enough allowances to cover its emissions for a given year, it could either reduce its emissions or purchase additional allowances by auction or from other market participants.127 A company that surrenders insufficient allowances to cover its emissions shall be liable for a penalty of €100/ton of CO2 equivalent, the payment of which does not release the company from its obligation to surrender the remaining allowances within the
following calendar year.128

A cap-and-trade system was chosen by the EC to address the concerns that directly limiting emissions would not provide the flexibility for companies to allocate reductions themselves, and imposing carbon taxes would require uniformity of rates across countries and would not ensure the achievement of the target level of emissions.129 In other words, trading allows companies within the relevant industries to determine the best and least-cost way for them to jointly meet the imposed system cap.130 That a system cap is set over a period of time also helps the EU keep track of and meet its international
environmental emission goals.131

Some concerns have been expressed that the implementation of the ETS may adversely affect EU firms’ competitiveness and may cause carbon leakage, i.e., the displacement of emissions into regions outside the EU due to their regulation instead of their overall reduction. 132 Firm competitiveness may be reduced because firms are forced to incur costs associated with pollution abatement and with the purchase of emission allowances.133 That said, studies that take into account profits, exports, sales, employment, productivity, and stock prices have found that the ETS does not seem to have any negative statistical effect on firms’ competitiveness
and does not cause carbon leakage.134

Another study—using a statistical model that compares the current level of emissions against the level that would have prevailed if the EU ETS were not introduced— found that the ETS’s implementation caused a reduction in CO2 emissions of around 1.2 billion tons from 2008 to 2016, representing 3.8 percent of total emissions for those years.135 This supports the view that the introduction of carbon markets in other countries or regions may be an effective strategy, as long as they are supported by long-term political will.136 Despite promising results, it has been opined that to mitigate any potential adverse effects, carbon pricing policies such as the EU ETS may be accompanied by other policy
measures.137

International Solar Alliance

The International Solar Alliance (ISA) was conceived by India and France in 2015 during COP21 and is aimed at deploying solar energy solutions to combat climate change.138 As of 2020, 101 countries have signed the ISA Framework Agreement and 80 have ratified it to become full members of the ISA.139 By mobilizing USD $1 trillion by 2030 and in cooperation with development banks and civil society organizations, ISA intends to develop and use solar energy solutions to help its member countries transition towards low-carbon growth, with particular focus on those classified as least developed countries and small
island developing states.140

Some of its programs are: (1) scaling solar applications for agricultural use, focused on decentralizing solar applications in rural settings; (2) scaling solar mini- grids, catering to needs of members in areas with unreliable or no grids; (3) scaling solar e-mobility and storage, to establish ecosystems for the large scale deployment of energy storage systems; and (4) solar for green hydrogen, aimed at accelerating green hydrogen
production and use among member countries.141

As regards performance, it has been observed that whether ISA is achieving its goals is difficult to gauge inasmuch as its formation and the solidification of its membership have taken some time.142 In addition, a weakness has been cited that there is no discussion of intellectual property, law, and practice in the ISA
Framework Agreement.143

V. Conclusion—Part I

Despite the lack of consensus on the definition of green technology, acting towards the development of technologies to fight against climate change is much more crucial than any theoretical debate. Whether it is through private or public sector initiatives, striking a balance between sound technology and effective environmental policy should be a major focus of legislators, policy makers and the industry. The relevance of IP and especially patents is prevalent in this context, considering the leading role of innovation and ground-breaking
inventions for sustainability.

In Part I, this article described the different definitions for green technology adopted by different international institutions such as WIPO and EPO and explored the role of patents in an environment increasingly interested in sustainability. Companies that invest in technology innovation would be staunch supporters and drivers of environmentally friendly technological progress, given the proper incentives. These incentives include robust IPR protection and return on investment that would lead to additional innovation in line with sustainability policies. For the desired results to occur, however, public, private and hybrid initiatives are required. In this Part, the reader learned more about public initiatives,
taken at both national and regional levels.

Part II, to be published in the next edition, will continue to explore in detail the private and hybrid initiatives that are currently underway with the aim of tackling climate change and promoting environmental R&D and sustainability. Apart from individual industry initiatives, collaborative platforms such as standards development organizations (SDOs)—that foster the development of technical standards and norms assuring interoperability— are considered significant fora for encouraging and
realizing environmental objectives. ■

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*Aileen M. Sanguir is IPR and Licensing Manager at Ericsson AB. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent Ericsson’s position.

  1. Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement (12 December 2015) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Paris Agreement).
  2. United Nations Climate Change, “The Paris Agreement” (United Nations Climate Change undated) <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-parisagreement> accessed 19 November 2021.
  3. Paris Agreement, art. 2(1)(a).
  4. Myles Allen, Opha Pauline Dube, William Solecki, Fernando Aragón-Durand, Wolfgang Cramer, Stephen Humphreys, Mikiko Kainuma, Jatin Kala, Natalie Mahowald, Yacob Mulugetta, Rosa Perez, Morgan Wairiu, Kirsten Zickfeld, “Framing and Context” in Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds), Global Warmingof 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of globalwarming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related globalgreenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengtheningthe global response to the threat of climate change, sustainabledevelopment, and efforts to eradicate poverty (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2019) 49, 53.
  5. Kasha Patel, “Why Pakistan’s Record-Breaking Monsoon Season is so Devastating” (Washington D.C., 31 August 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/08/31/monsoon-pakistan-flooding-explainer/> accessed 10 February 2023.
  6. ibid.
  7. ibid.
  8. Emily Cassidy, “Worst Drought on Record Parches Horn of Africa” (California, December 2022) <https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/150712/worst-drought-on-record-parcheshorn-of-africa> accessed 10 February 2023.
  9. ibid.
  10. ibid.
  11. Marianne Lehnis, “2022 Was a Year of Record-Breaking Extreme Weather Events” (New York City, 29 December 2022) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariannelehnis/2022/12/29/2022-was-a-year-of-recordbreaking-extreme-weather-events/> accessed 10 February 2023.
  12. ibid.
  13. Diana Leonard, “California is Supposed to Enter a Wet Season. More Drought is Forecast” (Washington D.C., 25 October 2022) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/2022/10/25/california-drought-forecast-recorddry/> accessed 10 February 2023.
  14. ibid.
  15. United Nations, “WMO Releases ‘Tell-Tale Signs’ of Extreme Weather Conditions Around the World” (New York City, 23 December 2022) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131992> accessed 16 February 2023.
  16. Marianne Lehnis, “2022 Was a Year of Record-Breaking Extreme Weather Events” (New York City, 29 December 2022) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariannelehnis/2022/12/29/2022-was-a-year-of-record-breaking-extreme-weather-events/> accessed 10 February 2023.
  17. ibid.
  18. United Nations Climate Change, “Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference—November 2022” (United NationsClimate Change undated) <https://unfccc.int/cop27> accessed 13 February 2023.
  19. United Nations Climate Change, “COP27 Reaches Breakthrough Agreement on New ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund for Vulnerable Countries” (United Nations Climate Change, 20 November 2022) <https://unfccc.int/news/cop27-reachesbreakthrough-agreement-on-new-loss-and-damage-fund-for-vulnerable-countries> accessed 14 February 2023.
  20. ibid.
  21. David Carlin, “COP 27 Recap: The Good, The Bad, And What’s Next After The Climate Conference” (New York City, 16 December 2022) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidcarlin/2022/12/16/cop-27-recap-the-good-the-bad-and-whatsnext-after-the-climate-conference/> accessed 16 February 2023.
  22. Georgina Rannard and Esme Stallard, “COP27: What have global leaders done on climate change in 2022?” (London, 20 November 2022) <https://www.bbc.com/news/scienceenvironment-63458945> accessed 16 February 2023.
  23. ibid.
  24. ibid.
  25. ibid.
  26. UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative (FI), “COP27—‘Loss and damage’ success tempered by lack of implementation” (UN Environment Programme FI 7 December 2022) <https://www.unepfi.org/themes/climate-change/cop27-loss-and-damage-success-tempered-by-lack-of-implementation/> accessed 15 March 2023.
  27. Robert Anex, “Stimulating Innovation in Green Technology: Policy Alternatives and Opportunities” (2000) 44(2) AmericanBehavioral Scientist 188, 191.
  28. Emma Tompkins and W. Neil Adger, “Defining response capacity to enhance climate change policy” (2005) 8 Env Sci &Pol’y 562, 568-569.
  29. Kristina Lybecker and Sebastian Lohse for the World Intellectual Property Organization, “Innovation and Diffusion of Green Technologies: The Role of Intellectual Property and Other Enabling Factors (Global Challenges Report)” (WIPO 2015) 20, citing IEA 2014.
  30. Grazia Cecere, Nicoletta Corrocher, Maria Luisa Mancusi, “Financial constraints and public funding of eco-innovation: empirical evidence from European SMEs” (2020) 54 Small BusEcon 285, 287.
  31. Anex (n 27) 191.
  32. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) aims “to reduce anthropogenic carbon emissions by storing CO2 in the subsurface instead of emitting it into the atmosphere.” CCS has three major parts: (1) capture of CO2 from a large stationary source, (2) transport to a storage site, and (3) storage. Karl W. Bandilla, “Carbon Capture and Storage” in Trevor M. Letcher (ed.), “Future Energy: Improved, Sustainable and Clean Options for Our Planet 3rd ed” (Elsevier 2020).
  33. Radiative cooling enables objects to dissipate heat into outer space in the form of electromagnetic waves and to achieve cooling without any external energy input. It is useful for energy saving applications. Bin Zhao, Mingke Hu, Xianze Ao, Nuo Chen, Gang Pei, “Radiative cooling: A review of fundamentals, materials, applications, and prospects” (2019) 236 Applied Energy 489.
  34. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992) Agenda 21, Rio Declaration, Chap 34, 34.1.
  35. See Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 5.
  36. Stefano Angelucci, F. Javier Hurtado-Albir, Alessia Volpe, “Supporting global initiatives on climate change: The EPO’s ‘Y02-Y04S’ tagging scheme” (2018) 54 World Patent Information S85.
  37. The Y02 subclasses relate to specific clean energy technologies, buildings, transportation, and others. The Y04S subclass on smart grids covers remote network operation, smart metering, electric and hybrid vehicles interoperability, and energy trading and marketing. European Patent Office, “Sustainable Technologies” (European Patent Office undated) <https://www.epo.org/news-events/in-focus/classification/classification.html> accessed 11 May 2022.
  38. Smart grids are “automated, widely distributed energy delivery networks with a two-way flow of electricity and information,” which are capable of responding to changes that range from the power source, user preferences, or even individual appliances. European Patent Office, “Finding sustainable technologies in patents (brochure)” (EPO undated) 3.
  39. ibid 7.
  40. ibid 3.
  41. Yann Ménière (EPO, Chief Economist), “Green Technologies” (Advanced Lecture Series on Green Technologies—Lecture 1, Munich, November 2021).
  42. Philipp Hoff, “Greentech Innovation and Diffusion: A Financial Economics and Firm-Level Perspective” (1st ed, Gabler Verlag 2012) 7.
  43. Isak Lind and Rasmus Kockgård, “Spreading green IoT tech through mechanisms of sharing intellectual property” (Master’s thesis, Chalmers University of Technology 2021) 35.
  44. Hon. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, “Patent Rights in a Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism” (2016) 30(1) HarvJL&T 103, 105.
  45. 4iP Council in collaboration with ASTP, European IP Helpdesk, EPO, France Brevets, GRUR, IPAN and Intellectual Property Institute Luxembourg, “4 Reasons to Patent” (undated) <https://www.4ipcouncil.com/4smes/4-reasons-patent> accessed 11 January 2022.
  46. Nyske Blokhuis (EP&C Patent Attorneys Netherlands, Associate Partner), “IP Strategy for Green Tech” (Advanced Lecture Series on Green Technologies—Lecture 2, Munich, November 2021).
  47. ibid.
  48. World Energy Council, “Energy Sector Environmental Innovation: Understanding the Roles of Technology Diffusion, Intellectual Property Rights, and Sound Environmental Policy for Climate Change” (World Energy Council, 2011) 11 citing Idris K, Arai H. “The Intellectual Property-Conscious Nation: Mapping the Path from Developing to Developed” (WIPO, 2006) 27) <https://www.worldenergy.org/assets/downloads/wec_rules_of_trade__ipp_paper.pdf> accessed 9 May 2022.
  49. ibid 19.
  50. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 10.
  51. ibid 11; Investors consider patents “a measure of value and a method of communication for business development.” See 4iP Council, Interview with Didier Tranchier, Founder and President of ADELIT (Brussels, 25 September 2015) <https://www.4ipcouncil.com/features/investors-perspective>.
  52. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 22.
  53. World Energy Council (n 48) 10.
  54. See Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 7; see also Francesco Pasimeni, Alessandro Fiorini, Aliki Georgakaki, “International landscape of the inventive activity on climate change mitigation technologies. A patent analysis” (2021) 36 Energy Strategy Reviews 1.
  55. Pasimeni, Fiorini, Georgakaki (n 54) 2.
  56. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 21.
  57. Ohlhausen (n 44) 130 citing Petra Moser, “How do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World’s Fairs” (2005) 95 Am Econ Rev 1214, 1214.
  58. Under open innovation, companies collaborate with external firms or organizations in developing innovative processes. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 11.
  59. World Energy Council (n 48) 12.
  60. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 10.
  61. World Energy Council (n 48) 10.
  62. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 11.
  63. Ohlhausen (n 44) 105.
  64. Bronwyn Hall and Christian Helmers, “Innovation and diffusion of clean/green technology: Can patent commons help?” (2013) 66 J Env E&Mgmt 33, 34.
  65. ibid.
  66. World Energy Council (n 48) 15 citing Khor M. “Challenges of the Green Economy Concept and Policies in the Context of Sustainable Development, Poverty and Equity” in UNDESA/ UNEP/UNCTD “The Transition to a Green Economy: Benefits, Challenges and Risks from a Sustainable Development Perspective” (UNDESA DSD, UNEP, UNCTAD, 2011) 87 and UNFCCC, “Technologies for Adaptation to Climate Change” (Bonn. 2006) 9.
  67. ibid citing Barton JH, “Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries” in ICTSD Trade and Sustainable Energy Series Issue Paper 2 (2007) 4.
  68. ibid 21.
  69. ibid 2.
  70. ibid 21.
  71. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 3.
  72. Other options cited in literature are mandates as well as environmental and technical standards and regulations. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 23.
  73. Anex (n 27) 195.
  74. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 25.
  75. ibid.
  76. ibid 29.
  77. Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “Advanced examination for green technologies” (Canadian IPO 8 June 2021) <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr04746.html> accessed 7 December 2021.
  78. ibid.
  79. Isi Caulder and Justin Philpott, “Fast-Tracking Your Green Technology at the Canadian Patent Office Has Never Been Better” (Bereskin & Parr LLP 13 October 2020) <https://www.bereskinparr.com/doc/fast-tracking-your-green-technology-atthe-canadian-patent-office-has-never-been-better> accessed 7 December 2021.
  80. Brion Raffoul, “Fast Track to a Cleaner Future: Accelerating Green Technology at the Canadian Patent Office” (BrionRaffoul IP Law 7 June 2021) <https://bripgroup.com/2021/news/fast-track-to-a-cleaner-future-accelerating-green-technology-at-the-canadian-patent-office/> accessed 7 December 2021.
  81. United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office, “Patents: accelerated processing” (UKIPO 18 December 2019) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/patents-accelerated-processing> accessed 7 December 2021.
  82. For this purpose, a green invention is one that “has an energy-saving effect and contributes to CO2 reduction.” Administrative Affairs Division, Japan IPO, “Outline of Accelerated Examination and Accelerated Appeal Examination” (Japan IPO 24 September 2021) <https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/system/patent/shinsa/jp-soki/> accessed 7 December 2021.
  83. Sterne Kessler Goldstein & Fox PLLC, “Global initiatives to accelerate examination of cleantech patent applications” (Lexology 11 March 2015) <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ab9bb966-0b9c-4ca1-9192-35fb105f2f55> accessed 7 December 2021.
  84. ibid.
  85. The program provides that the first office action shall be issued within one month from request. Unlike programs of other countries, only technologies funded or certified by the Korean government as “green” or designated as such in environmental legislation are eligible under the super-accelerated examination system. Trade and Cooperation Division, Korean Intellectual Property Office, “IP Policies: Three-track Patent and Utility Model Examination System” (Korean IPO 24 May 2016) <https://www.kipo.go.kr/en/HtmlApp?c=100000&catmenu=ek02_01_02_01> accessed 7 December 2021.
  86. Pedro Moreira in collaboration with WIPO Magazine, “Updated Landscape on Expedited Protection of ‘Green’ Inventions in Brazil” (WIPO Green 18 May 2021) <https://www3.wipo.int/wipogreen/en/news/2021/news_0016.html> accessed 7 December 2021.
  87. Eligible technologies cover not only green tech, but also new generation of information technology, biology, high-end equipment manufacturing, and new material. Examination shall be completed within one year from approval of the acceleration request. Antoine Dechezleprêtre for the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, “Fast-tracking Green Patent Applications: An Empirical Analysis,” Issue Paper No. 37 (ICTSD 2013) 4-5.
  88. “Green energy technologies” was recently amended to “green technologies,” effective on 1 January 2022. International Affairs and Planning Division, Taiwan Intellectual Property Office, “Accelerated Examination Program (AEP)” (Taiwan IPO 2 November 2021) <https://www.tipo.gov.tw/en/cp-824-873219-841ee-2.html> accessed 7 December 2021.
  89. Dechezleprêtre (n 87) 6.
  90. ibid.
  91. Interviews with IP professionals, however, revealed that the last factor is not a large issue in practice. ibid 8.
  92. ibid 7.
  93. ibid 16.
  94. ibid 12.
  95. Dechezleprêtre (n 87) 12.
  96. These are those cited when a patent application is filed, which show the previous patents that the inventor built on to develop the new technology. ibid.
  97. ibid.
  98. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 20.
  99. Cecere, Corrocher, Mancusi (n 30) 286.
  100. Lybecker and Lohse (n 29) 21.
  101. United States Environmental Protection Agency, “About the SBIR Program” (EPA 30 August 2021) <https://www.epa.gov/sbir/about-sbir-program> accessed 8 December 2021.
  102. ibid.
  103. ibid.
  104. ibid.
  105. ibid.
  106. United States Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA’s SBIR: Novel Technologies to Monitor Air Quality from Wildland Fires to Protect Public Health” (EPA 15 November 2021) <https://www.epa.gov/sbir/epas-sbir-novel-technologiesmonitor-air-quality-wildland-fires-protect-public-health> accessed 8 December 2021.
  107. Robson Braga de Andrade, “Financing Innovation in Brazil” in Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (eds), “Global Innovation Index 2020 Who Will Finance Innovation”? (Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO 2020) 149, 150.
  108. ibid.
  109. ibid.
  110. Cecere, Corrocher, Mancusi (n 30) 288 citing Olmos, L, Ruester, S, & Liong, S-J, “On the selection of financing instruments to push the development of new technologies: application to clean energy technologies” (2012) 43 Energy Policy 252.
  111. ibid 293.
  112. Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Elias Einiö, Ralf Martin, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, John Van Reenen, “Do tax incentives increase firm innovation? An RD Design for R&D” (2020) Working Paper 4 <https://as.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu-as/econ/misc/Do%20tax%20incentives%20increase%20firm%20innovation.pdf> accessed 9 December 2021.
  113. HM Revenue & Customs, “Guidance: Claiming Research and Development tax reliefs” (UKHMRC 20 March 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/corporation-tax-research-anddevelopment-rd-relief> accessed 9 December 2021.
  114. Silvia Appelt, “OECD R&D tax incentives database, 2021 edition” (OECD 2021) 4 <https://www.oecd.org/sti/rdtax-stats-database.pdf> accessed 9 December 2021.
  115. Dechezleprêtre, Einiö, Martin, Nguyen, Van Reenen (n 112).
  116. ibid 29.
  117. ibid 30.
  118. Pasimeni, Fiorini, Georgakaki (n 54) 2.
  119. European Commission, “EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)” (EC undated) <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/euaction/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets_en> accessed 20 December 2021.
  120. ibid.
  121. European Commission, EU ETS Handbook (European Union 2015) 4.
  122. Council Directive (EC) 2003/87 of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L275/32 (ETS Directive), art. 3(a).
  123. Patrick Bayer and Michaël Aklin, “The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO2 emissions despite low prices” (2020) 117(16) PNAS 8804.
  124. European Commission (n 121) 16.
  125. ETS Directive, art. 5(2)(e).
  126. European Commission (n 121) 16.
  127. ibid.
  128. ETS Directive, art. 16(3).
  129. European Commission (n 121) 5.
  130. ibid.
  131. ibid.
  132. Stefano F Verde, “The impact of the EU Emissions Trading System on competitiveness and carbon leakage: the econometric evidence” (2020) 34(2) Journal of Economic Surveys 320, 321.
  133. Eugénie Joltreau and Katrin Sommerfeld, “Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms’ competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature” (2019) 19(4) Climate Policy 453.
  134. Verde (n 132) 335.
  135. Patrick Bayer and Michaël Aklin, “The European Union Emissions Trading System Reduced CO2 Emissions Despite Low Prices” (2020) 117(16) PNAS 8804, 8809.
  136. ibid 8809.
  137. Verde (n 132) 321.
  138. International Solar Alliance, “About ISA” (ISA undated) <https://isolaralliance.org/about/background> accessed 26 January 2022.
  139. ibid.
  140. ibid.
  141. International Solar Alliance, “Our Work” (ISA undated) <https://isolaralliance.org/work/scaling-solar-applicationagricultural-use> accessed 26 January 2022.
  142. Matthew Rimmer, “Beyond the Paris Agreement: Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy, and Climate Justice” (2019) 8 Laws 7, 16. worst
  143. 143. ibid 15.

Public And Private Initiatives To Accelerate The Development And Diffusion Of Green Tech Part II

1. Introduction

Environmental degradation has brought green technologies to the forefront as a much-needed means to a sustainable end. Part I of this article1 introduced the notion of green tech and how patents are instrumental for attaining a sustainable future. Cutting-edge technologies result from multi-year research and development (R&D) by companies that strive to come up with new ideas and turn them into useful inventions. This requires considerable investment in R&D. The cycle of innovation is relentless; the higher the investment, the higher the chances of ground-breaking and meaningful outcomes for consumers. The same applies to green technology. Different stakeholders from different industries have sustainable goals and aim towards green innovation. These objectives require capital and sufficient Intellectual Property Rights(IPR) protection.

Still, the public sector is expected to support these private initiatives by, for example, offering governmental subsidies or tax incentives for the promotion of technologies that mitigate environmental damage. Such tax-related actions are already in place in the UK and in many EU countries, with positive effects in green R&D and innovation. On a regional and international level, some initiatives that target carbon emissions have been established.

Part II goes on to discuss some examples of private and hybrid initiatives. The latter refers to actions that are not solely government-mandated or industry-driven. In this hybrid context, this article will focus on (i) several international platforms that provide an avenue for the cooperation of different stakeholders, and (ii) standardization as a means to establish inter-industry cooperation and achieve interoperable results without abandoning the necessary environmental objectives.

2. Private Initiatives

While the rate and direction of innovation is influenced by public policy, it has been observed that the ability to develop green tech lies primarily in the private sector.2 Indeed, stricter environmental regulations, innovation by competitors, increased consumer demand for greener products, and adoption of carbon caps by different countries to comply with international commitments together serve as strong incentives for companies to invest in green products and processes.

For example, the BASF Group, a German multinational chemical company, has committed to be more efficient in production and energy usage, to increase the use of renewable energies, and to accelerate the deployment of CO2-free processes in production.3 BASF places particular focus on moving towards a circular economy—which transforms value creation from linear to circular—by increasing its use of recycled and renewable materials, shaping new material cycles, and creating new business models.4

Some examples of companies moving towards the circular economy are IKEA, adidas, Ericsson, and AB InBev. IKEA launched its People and Planet Strategy in 2018, where it endeavors to use renewable or recycled materials for all IKEA products and packaging by 2030, e.g., rugs produced from recycled PET bottles and curtains dyed with materials from agricultural waste.5 adidas has likewise launched a “Loop Creation Process” for the manufacture of fully recyclable footwear, producing FUTURECRAFT.LOOP, shoes that can be returned to adidas and thereafter reused to manufacture new running shoes.6

Ericsson, a global provider of ICT to service providers, implements its Ericsson Global Product Take-Back Program in 180 countries, where more than 98 percent of the material content of products at their end of life are recycled with high environmental standards.7 The company likewise conducts an annual assessment of its carbon footprint, and has targeted to reduce the same by 35 percent in 2022 (benchmarked against 2016) through the more efficient use of its energy and transport resources.8 AB (Anheuser-Busch) InBev—the world’s largest brewer with brands such as Budweiser, Beck’s, Corona, and Stella Artois—has worked towards changing its packaging so that 100 percent of its products will be packaged in returnable or majority-recycled material by 2025.9

Patent protection is important for the transition into a circular economy and for the development of sustainable packaging materials, a lot of which consists of plastic. Indeed, an EPO study shows that mechanical plastic recycling10 generated nearly 4,500 international patent families11 (IPFs) from 2010 to 2019 while chemical and biological recycling methods generated over 9,000 IPFs over the same period.12 In fact, adidas’s FUTURECRAFT.LOOP shoes uses its patented Boost foam sole.13

As earlier discussed, quality patents14 send a signal regarding the value of a company’s inventions to the market and could encourage technology collaboration and partnerships among market participants.15 There are various collaborative arrangements available to companies to gain access to technology—joint ventures, joint R&D, technology exchange agreements, direct investment or sourcing, and restructuring.16 Partnerships and collaborative arrangements are particularly important for green tech because the right to practice the technology does not necessary translate to the ability to use it, and partnerships typically grant access to the know-how for the use or implementation of technology.17 Patents play a crucial role in this regard because they help potential partners identify what each party brings to the relationship and thus the potential value of the collaboration.18

To illustrate, SABIC (chemicals company headquartered in Saudi Arabia), Linde (global industrial gases and engineering company), and BASF have entered into a joint agreement to develop solutions for electrically heated steam cracker19 furnaces, with the objective of using renewable energy instead of fossil fuels for the heating process and contributing to the reduction of CO2 emissions within the chemical industry.20 For this effort, BASF and SABIC “combined their extensive know-how and intellectual property” and Linde likewise “contributed with its intellectual property.”21

Similarly, Swedish companies SSAB (developer of high-strength steel),22 LKAB (international mining and minerals group),23 and Vattenfall (producer and retailer of electricity and heat for the European market)24 have formed Hybrit Development AB to jointly develop the first fossil-free steel, with the potential of reducing Sweden’s CO2 emissions by at least ten percent.25 The “HYBRIT demonstration project,” granted funding under the EU Innovation Fund, shall accomplish this by replacing “coal-based blast furnaces with direct hydrogen- based reduction technology.”26 In this connection, Hybrit has filed patent applications for the process of producing carburized sponge iron, published in November 2021.27

Another driving force for the development and diffusion of green tech is open source software, which could enhance collaboration for climate change solutions28. Open source is defined by the Open Source Initiative29 as software that permits access to and distribution of the source code, is freely distributable, and allows modifications and the production of derived works.30 Thus, it provides a foundation for the integration of green tech products by different entities, dispensing with the need to write new code whenever one technological component interacts with another.31 In this regard, some have opined that open source could serve as a unique modality to develop and disseminate renewable energy technology.32

For instance, there is the FIWARE community, “an independent Open Community” aimed at “building an open and sustainable ecosystem around public, royalty- free and implementation-driven software platform standards that ease the development of new Smart Applications in multiple sectors.”33 In other words, members and participants in FIWARE contribute technology to the community which, in turn, is used for the development of smart solutions in domains such as smart water, smart cities, industry, energy, and agrifood. 34 From these contributions, FIWARE offers a host of platforms, IoT devices (e.g., environment monitors, urban communication devices, public lighting control systems, etc.), software enablers, and support services.35 Some platinum members of the FIWARE community are Atos, NEC, Red Hat, and Telefónica, and it has 108 members to date.36

In addition, there is LF Energy—an open source community hosted within The Linux Foundation—aimed at solving problems in connection with the decarbonization of energy through digitalization of power systems and the use of open source software.37 LF Energy envisions open-source-software-defined infrastructure as a strong tool for decarbonization because open interfaces allow interoperability between utilities and end users, and shared technology development would enable faster energy transition.38 Some projects born out of LF Energy are PowSyBl (library dedicated to electrical grid modeling and simulation), Hyphae (tool to make the grid more resilient and flexible with microgrids), and FledgePOWER (multi-protocol translation gateway for power systems).39 These examples show the capacity of open-source to promote the collaborative development and diffusion of green tech and CCMT among industry participants. That said, it should be noted that there is no general perception that an open-source model leads to better quality software, and opinions vary on the quality, reliability, and speed of innovation in open-source.40

On quality, it has been noted that since there is no vendor for open-source software, users must rely for technical support on online forums, vendors of particular distributions, or third-party companies offering support contracts—an aspect that causes discomfort for some users.41 In addition, other drawbacks include compatibility problems with companies’ current technology, poor documentation of software development, and less functionality.42 Consequently, the adoption of open source software may entail some hidden costs, e.g., on user training and configuration43 or on premium professional support.44 Some ways to mitigate these drawbacks are to increase awareness of open source and to include it in strategies supported by top management of companies.45

3. Hybrid Initiatives

Aside from government-implemented market-based mechanisms and private-sector-initiated efforts, there are also instances when international organizations, government bodies, and private actors work with and among each other to develop systems promoting a more environmentally sustainable path.

a) Platforms for Collaboration

WIPO GREEN

WIPO GREEN, established by WIPO in 2013 and dubbing itself as “The Marketplace for Sustainable Technology,” is an online marketplace that intends to bridge technology providers with those requiring innovative solutions.46 It is an online database that connects owners of new technologies to enterprises intending to commercialize, license, or distribute green tech.47 WIPO GREEN boasts of a growing network consisting of 6,000 members from 170 countries.48

Some climate-friendly technologies featured on the WIPO GREEN online database in 2020 are (1) Saneco, an eco-friendly sanitary napkin disposal and recycling unit invented by PadCare Labs (India); (2) waste plastic conversion technology for liquefaction of waste plastic invented by Fujitsu (Japan); (3) ANTISMOG, a technology solution invented by Net Sas (France) that reduces harmful emissions from combustion engines by up to 80 percent; and (4) ECOLOO, a stand-alone, decentralized biological toilet invented by ECOLOO AB (Sweden) that breaks down solid waste into particles or ashes and liquid waste into natural fertilizer.49

Aside from providing an online database listing the available technologies and the needs of its users, WIPO GREEN likewise organizes and holds regional match- making events targeting specific fields of technology.50 This is a useful way of informing stakeholders of available technologies and matching companies or institutions with each other. However, while some perceive WIPO GREEN to be a success,51 it has also been argued that it needs to further scale up its activities to achieve its goal of accelerating green tech dissemination.52

Global Cleantech Innovation Programme

The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) partnered with the Global Environment Facility to establish the Global Cleantech Innovation Programme (GCIP),53 an idea that stemmed from COP17 in South Africa.54 GCIP serves as an accelerator for cleantech innovators, helps build capacity within national institutions and partner organizations, and works with national policy makers to strengthen policy frameworks for SMEs and entrepreneurs.55 While labelled as a global program, UNIDO implemented GCIP as nine separate national-level projects.56 In particular, it was launched in Armenia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey in 2013; in Morocco and Thailand in 2016; and in Ukraine in 2017.57

An evaluation conducted in 2018 showed that GCIP-funded start-ups “are developing innovations with climate benefits and other environmental and social co-benefits,”58 whose products include environmentally- friendly sanitary pads, reduction of agricultural waste, access to cleaner water, and reduction of health risks.59

b) Standardization: Global Green Tech Solutions

Standards are “technical specifications defining requirements for products, production processes, services, or test-methods.”60 These specifications are often aimed at guaranteeing interoperability to a certain degree or to define a minimum level of performance.61 Standards come in different forms: (1) de facto standards or those that evolve through market dynamics and result from widespread adoption by consumers62 (2) legal standards or those imposed by public or transnational authorities,63 and (3) standards developed cooperatively by private organizations64 or through industry collaboration.65

This section focuses on the third type, i.e., formal standards, which are developed within the auspices of standard developing organizations (SDOs)66—voluntary and consensus-based organizations specializing in the development of standards.67 SDOs are governed by rules and regulations agreed upon by their members, which typically include technology contributors, implementers of standards,68 universities, government agencies, consumer or industry groups, or even other SDOs.69

An example of an SDO is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which the EC rec ognizes as one of the official European standardization bodies.70 ETSI is, in turn, one of the members of the 3rd Generation Partnership (3GPP) standardization consortium, a global partnership composed of seven national telecommunications SDOs71 and involved in cellular communications technologies, including radio access, and core network and service capabilities.72 In fact, 3GPP has been described as “the leading organization for the development of globally accepted solutions” for mobile network interfaces and functionality.73

Standardization drives innovation “by establishing interoperability between products and by facilitating market adoption of innovative technologies.”74 The adoption of standards facilitates seamless communication among a wide range of devices from different manufacturers.75 In this way, they not only allow the “interworking of different parts of complex systems,” but also lay the basis for a common language that defines products, services, and process requirements.76 With defined standards, industry participants could benefit from reduced development time and design costs for products,77 decreased time-to-market, and global product reach due to interoperability that transcends national borders.78 Since standards are aimed at meeting well-defined objectives, standard-setting and development also enable efficient and target-oriented innovation.79

Telecommunications, consumer electronics, automotive, and electricity are some industries where standardization plays an important role and where standards comprise patented technologies.80 A patented invention that is necessary to comply with a technical standard is called a standard-essential patent (SEP).81 Usually, SDOs encourage their members to make their SEPs available on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions.82 FRAND ensures that implementers can gain access to these standardized technologies, while rewarding innovators that incorporated their cutting edge technologies to the standard.

To illustrate, the mobile telecommunications industry is driven forward by standardization. Wireless technologies, such as 2G (GSM), 3G (UMTS), 4G (LTE), and 5G standards are highly complex technologies, which required hundreds of thousands of technical contributions.83 This in turn has led to thousands of patented technologies84 made available on FRAND terms. The success of FRAND has been proved as it allowed for the development and dissemination of these standards, which have since been adopted by millions of consumer electronic devices around the world.85

The use of standardized technologies or the standardization of green tech solutions may prove to be beneficial. Indeed, it has been observed that 5G—a telecommunications standard that delivers higher multi-gigabit peak data speeds, ultra-low latency, and increased reliability— could help factories, logistics networks, power companies, and other operators within the energy, manufacturing, and transport sector to operate more efficiently and to meet their sustainability objectives.86 Particularly, 5G could help power companies with dynamic load management and with the synchronization of dispersed renewable production facilities with traditional grids.87 As for manufacturing, cellular-connected production management systems and IoT tracking could help reduce energy consumption and enhance production efficiency, together contributing to reduced carbon emissions.88 Similarly, the connectivity and integration of transportation and communication networks through telematics, smart city analytics, and traffic management solutions, could lead to efficiencies that reduce emissions in the transport sector.89

Given the foregoing, it is apparent that the implementation of standardized technologies for green tech solutions, as well as the development of separate standards for emission-heavy industries, could help in achieving sustainability goals. In fact, the EC has recognized that standards bring “immense value for the competitiveness of enterprises working in transport, machinery, electro-technical products, or telecommunications.”90

4. Discussion and Conclusion

A problem as colossal as climate change requires not only a rectification of environmental damage already inflicted, but also a fundamental and global re-orientation of existing structures and processes. Technology is a potent tool that can drive this transition, but only if public and private efforts on technology development are harmonized and properly channeled. A dynamic combination of public/institutional and private efforts is necessary for this purpose. As earlier noted however, private commitment to green tech and to the high R&D investments it requires can only be secured and sustained through robust patent policy, and global regulatory, trade, and financial regimes conducive to investment and innovation.

A robust patent policy is important because it spurs innovative and collaborative activity, not only for large established companies but also for SMEs as well as academic and research institutions. The assurance of effective patent protection also promotes cooperation among nations, helping in technology transfer from developed countries to emerging economies and vice versa.

In addition to a strong patent framework, the examples cited in the first part of this article illustrate that private initiatives are heavily influenced by other public policies. There are various environmental regulations being implemented in different countries, which, while important in triggering a shift in practices by individuals and companies, are not enough to incentivize targeted technological development.91 To supplement these regulations, policymakers should establish and implement market-based mechanisms, such as providing direct financial support to firms’ green tech efforts; implementing carbon pricing for more developed technologies; and regulation-induced innovation incentives, including the definition of technological/ environmental standards.92 These mechanisms should have a long-term orientation and must be supported by strong political will; otherwise, industry participants would hesitate to make long-term investments in innovative technologies.93

The development and diffusion of green tech could further be promoted by other private and hybrid initiatives, specifically open source software and standardization. Both measures prevent the duplication of efforts—the former by allowing innovators to build on existing software to which free access is granted, and the latter by defining a clear path for technology development and implementation. That said, open-source software does not always have the same guarantees to access that formal standardization does.94

Standardization has a proven record of providing excellent quality (technical contributions are meticulously screened) and compatibility (devices conforming to a standard are freely interoperable). It likewise offers some additional benefits. First, SDOs typically encourage their members to make their SEPs available on FRAND terms, having the advantage of preserving the incentive to innovate (innovators profit from their technology), while at the same time ensuring access to the standardized technology by other innovators and implementers. Second, SDOs have a wide range of participants, i.e., technology contributors, implementers of standards, universities, government agencies, other SDOs. This allows various interests to be represented and shows that the development of standards is a truly collaborative process. The participation of different industry stakeholders increases the likelihood that a standard, once adopted, will readily be implemented. The example of WIPO Green shows that the matching of technology developers with the relevant users contributes to effective technology diffusion and that stakeholder participation is important in green tech efforts. Third, the development of standards for green tech would help in providing technological certainty, addressing the prevailing situation where there is no clear definition of green tech.

The foregoing considered, conceptualizing “green tech standards” would be no easy task, because there are many different technologies which could achieve the same environmentally beneficial results. The endeavor is worth further exploring however, taking into account the level of innovation and technology uptake in industries that are driven forward by standardization. ■

  1. Aileen M. Sanguir, “Public and Private Initiatives to Accelerate the Development and Diffusion of Green Tech—Part I,” les Nouvelles Volume LVIII No. 3, September 2023. Aileen is IPR and Licensing Manager at Ericsson AB. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent Ericsson’s position. She may be reached by email at aileensanguir@ gmail.com.
  2. Robert Anex, “Stimulating Innovation in Green Technology: Policy Alternatives and Opportunities” (2000) 44(2) American Behavioral Scientist 188, 196.
  3. BASF, “We create chemistry for a sustainable future” (BASF 2022) <https://www.basf.com/global/en/who-we-are/sustainability. html> accessed 5 January 2022.
  4. BASF, “Circular Economy at BASF” (BASF 22 April 2021) <https://www.basf.com/global/en/who-we-are/sustainability/ we-drive-sustainable-solutions/circular-economy.html> accessed 5 January 2022.
  5. Inês Lagoutte, “3 big companies leading the way in the circular economy” (Medium 29 November 2019) <https://medium. com/youth-for-global-goals/3-big-companies-leading-the-way-incircular- economy-926b4fc7dfc2> accessed 10 January 2022.
  6. adidas, “adidas Unlocks a Circular Future for Sports with FUTURECRAFT.LOOP (Press Release)” (17 April 2019) <https://www.adidas-group.com/en/media/news-archive/ press-releases/2019/adidas-unlocks-circular-future-sports-futurecraftloop/> accessed 10 January 2022.
  7. Ericsson, “Environmental sustainability” (Ericsson undated) <https://www.ericsson.com/en/about-us/sustainabilityand- corporate-responsibility/environment> accessed 26 January 2022.
  8. Ericsson, “Company impact” (Ericsson undated) <https:// www.ericsson.com/en/about-us/sustainability-and-corporateresponsibility/ environment/company-impacts> accessed 28 January 2022.
  9. Alex Thornton, “These 11 companies are leading the way to a circular economy” World Economic Forum (Cologny, 26 February 2019) <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/ companies-leading-way-to-circular-economy/> accessed 10 January 2022.
  10. This is “typically based on the melting and reforming of thermoplastics or on the use of scraps in the composition of new products.” European Patent Office, “Patents for tomorrow’s plastics: Global innovation trends in recycling, circular design and alternative sources” (EPO 2021) 18.
  11. Each international patent family covers a single invention and includes patent applications filed and published at several patent offices. It is a reliable proxy for inventive activity because it provides a degree of control for patent quality by only representing inventions for which the inventor considers the value sufficient to seek protection internationally. ibid 7.
  12. ibid 9.
  13. adidas AG, “Soles for sports shoes,” published as EP2649896A2 (16 October 2013) <https://worldwide.espacenet. com/patent/search/family/047522411/publication/ EP2649896A2?q=pn%3DEP2649896A2%3F> accessed 21 January 2022.
  14. On patent quality, see Claudia Tapia, “Assessing the quality of European patents” IAM Magazine (London, November/ December 2016) <https://www.4ipcouncil.com/application/ files/6414/8101/7709/2016.10_FINAL_VERSION_IAM80_ Patent-quality.pdf> accessed 9 May 2022.
  15. Kristina Lybecker and Sebastian Lohse for the World Intellectual Property Organization, “Innovation and Diffusion of Green Technologies: The Role of Intellectual Property and Other Enabling Factors (Global Challenges Report)” (WIPO 2015) 11.
  16. ibid 17.
  17. World Energy Council, “Energy Sector Environmental Innovation: Understanding the Roles of Technology Diffusion, Intellectual Property Rights, and Sound Environmental Policy for Climate Change” (World Energy Council, 2011) 12.
  18. ibid.
  19. Steam crackers are used in the production of basic chemicals and require large amounts of energy to break down hydrocarbons into olefins and aromatics. Cracking furnaces have been identified as “one of the largest CO2 emission sources in the whole petrochemical value chain.” BASF, SABIC, and Linde, “BASF, SABIC and Linde join forces to realize the world’s first electrically heated steam cracker furnace” (BASF, SABIC, Linde 2021) <https://www.basf.com/global/en/media/newsreleases/ 2021/03/p-21-165.html> accessed 21 January 2022.
  20. ibid.
  21. ibid.
  22. SSAB, “SSAB in brief” (SSAB undated) <https://www. ssab.com/company/about-ssab/ssab-in-brief> accessed 21 January 2022.
  23. LKAB, “LKAB in brief” (LKAB April 2021) <https:// www.lkab.com/en/about-lkab/lkab-in-brief/> accessed 21 January 2022.
  24. Vattenfall AB, “Who we are” (Vattenfall undated) <https://group.vattenfall.com/who-we-are> accessed 21 January 2022.
  25. Hybrit, “Fossil-free steel—a joint opportunity!” (Hybrit undated) <https://www.hybritdevelopment.se/en/> accessed 21 January 2022.
  26. Åsa Bäcklin, “HYBRIT Granted Support from EU Innovation Fund” (Hybrit November 2021) <https://www.hybritdevelopment. se/en/hybrit-support-from-eu-innovation-fund/> accessed 21 January 2022.
  27. Hybrit Development AB, “Process for the production of carburized sponge iron,” published as SE2050508A1 (5 November 2021) and WO2021225500A1 (11 November 2021) <https://worldwide.espacenet.com/patent/search/family/ 078468722/publication/SE2050508A1?q=hybrit> accessed 21 January 2022.
  28. 17 Global Goals, “SDGs, the green economy and open source tech: bringing sustainability to the forefront of business” (17 Global Goals 10 March 2021) <http://17globalgoals. com/sdgs-the-green-economy-and-open-source-tech-bringing- sustainability-to-the-forefront-of-business/> accessed 21 January 2022.
  29. The Open Source Initiative is a California public benefit corporation that is actively involved in Open Source communitybuilding, education, and public advocacy to promote awareness and inform on the importance of non-proprietary software. Open Source Initiative, “About the Open Source Initiative” (Open Source Initiative undated) <https://opensource.org/about> accessed 24 January 2022.
  30. Other criteria identified by the Open Source Initiative before software may be considered open source are that it must: (1) maintain the integrity of the author’s source code through the proper labelling of derived works, (2) not discriminate against persons or groups or against fields of endeavor, (3) not attach to a specific product, (4) not restrict other software, and (5) be technology-neutral. Open Source Initiative, “The Open Source Definition” (Open Source Initiative 22 March 2007) <https:// opensource.org/docs/osd> accessed 24 January 2022.
  31. 17 Global Goals (n 28).
  32. Jason R. Wiener, “Sharing Potential and the Potential for Sharing: Open Source Licensing as a Legal and Economic Modality for the Dissemination of Renewable Energy Technology” (2006) 18 Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev 277, 279.
  33. FIWARE, “About FIWARE” (FIWARE 2021) <https:// www.fiware.org/about-us/> accessed 24 January 2022.
  34. ibid.
  35. FIWARE, “FIWARE Marketplace” (FIWARE undated) <https://marketplace.fiware.org/> accessed 24 January 2022.
  36. FIWARE, “Organizations Directory” (FIWARE 2021) <https://www.fiware.org/community/members/organizations- directory/> accessed 24 January 2022.
  37. LF Energy, “Why LF Energy” (LF Energy 2020) <https:// www.lfenergy.org/why-lfenergy/> accessed 25 January 2022.
  38. LF Energy, “Why Open Source & Energy” (LF Energy 2020) <https://www.lfenergy.org/why-open-source/> accessed 25 January 2022.
  39. LF Energy, “All Projects” (LF Energy 2020) <https:// www.lfenergy.org/projects/> accessed 25 January 2022.
  40. Margaret S. Elliott, Kenneth L. Kraemer (eds), Computerization Movements and Technology Diffusion: from Mainframes to Ubiquitous Computing (American Society for Information Science and Technology 2008) 445.
  41. ibid.
  42. Lorraine Morgan and Patrick Finnegan, “Benefits and Drawbacks of Open Source Software: An Exploratory Study of Secondary Software Firms” (IFIP International Conference on Open Source Systems, Limerick, June 2007) 307, 310.
  43. Øyvind Hauge, Daniela Soares Cruzes, Reidar Conradi, Ketil Sandanger Velle, Tron André Skarpenes, “Risks and Risk Mitigation in Open Source Software Adoption: Bridging the Gap between Literature and Practice” (6th IFIP International Conference on Open Source Systems, Notre Dame, May 2010) 105, 107 citing Lorraine Morgan and Patrick Finnegan, “Benefits and Drawbacks of Open Source Software: An Exploratory Study of Secondary Software Firms” (IFIP International Conference on Open Source Systems, Limerick, June 2007) 307-312 and Francis Tiangco, Alison Stockwell, John Sapsford, and Austen Rainer, “Open-source software in an occupational health application: the case of Heales Medical Ltd.” in Marco Scotto and Giancarlo Succi, editors. Proceedings of The First International Conference on Open Source Systems (OSS2005), July 11th-15th, Genova, Italy, 2005.
  44. ibid 107 citing Brian Fitzgerald and Tony Kenny, “Developing an Information Systems Infrastructure with Open Source Software” IEEE Software, 21(1):50–55, 2004; Kris Ven, Jan Verelst, and Herwig Mannaert. Should You Adopt Open Source Software? IEEE Software, 25(3):54–59, 2008.
  45. Hauge, Cruzes, Conradi, Velle, Skarpenes (n 187) 113.
  46. WIPO GREEN, “About WIPO GREEN” (WIPO GREEN undated) <https://www3.wipo.int/wipogreen/en/aboutus/> accessed 25 January 2022.
  47. ibid.
  48. WIPO GREEN, “Connecting sustainable technology users and providers (brochure)” (WIPO GREEN 2018) 3.
  49. WIPO GREEN, “Year in Review 2020” (WIPO GREEN 2021) 13-14.
  50. WIPO GREEN, “WIPO Green Network” (WIPO GREEN undated) <https://www3.wipo.int/wipogreen/en/network/> accessed 25 January 2022.
  51. Christopher J. Clugston, “The Infamous Failure of the Eco-Patent Commons and the Quiet Success of the WIPO Green Project: What We Can Learn About Disseminating Green Tech to Developing Countries” (Vermont Journal of Environmental Law undated) <https://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/the-infamousfailure- of-the-eco-patent-commons-and-the-quiet-success-ofthe- wipo-green-project-what-we-can-learn-about-disseminatinggreen- tech-to-developing-countries> accessed 26 January 2022.
  52. Matthew Rimmer, “Beyond the Paris Agreement: Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy, and Climate Justice” (2019) 8 Laws 7, 11.
  53. United Nations Industrial Development Organization, “Global Cleantech Innovation Programme” (UNIDO undated) <https://www.unido.org/our-focus-safeguarding-environment- clean-energy-access-productive-use-climate-policies-andnetworks/ global-cleantech-innovation-programme> accessed 26 January 2022.
  54. Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office (GEF IEO), “Evaluation of the GEF-UNIDO Global Cleantech Innovation Programme” (GEF IEO, 2020) ix.
  55. UNIDO (n 53).
  56. GEF IEO (n 54) ix.
  57. ibid x.
  58. ibid xiii.
  59. ibid xiv.
  60. European Commission, “European standards” (EC undated) <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/europeanstandards_ en> accessed 27 January 2022.
  61. Dr. Habil, Nizar Abdelkaf, Prof. Raffaele Bolla, Cees J.M. Lanting, Dr. Alejandro Rodriguez-Ascaso, Marina Thuns, Dr. Michelle Wetterwald, “Understanding ICT Standardization: Principles and Practice” (ETSI 2018) 14.
  62. Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, “Can Standard-Setting lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND” (2007) 3 Eur Comp J 101, 103.
  63. ibid 104.
  64. ibid.
  65. Haris Tsilikas, “Collaborative Standardization and Disruptive Innovation: The Case of Wireless Telecommunication Standards” (2017) 48(2) IIC—International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 151, 153.
  66. ECORYS and Eindhoven Institute of Technology, “Patents and Standards: A modern framework for IPR-based standardization” (Publications Office of the European Union 2014) 31.
  67. Justus Baron, Jorge Contreras, Martin Husovec, Pierre Larouche, Nikolaus Thumm (ed), “Making the rules. The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights” (Publications Office of the European Union 2019) 20.
  68. Tsilikas (n 65) 155 citing Richard A. Epstein, Scott Kieff, and Daniel F. Spulber, “The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination” (2012) 8 J Comp L & Econ 10.
  69. Baron, Contreras, Husovec, Larouche, Thumm (n 67) 26.
  70. Other organizations recognized as official European standardization bodies are the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec). Regulation (EU) 2012/1025 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardization (2012) OJ L 316/12, recital 4.
  71. ETSI collects and publishes declarations of patents that are essential to 3GPP specifications. Baron, Contreras, Husovec, Larouche, Thumm (n 67) 29.
  72. 3GPP, “About 3GPP” (3GPP 2022) <https://www.3gpp. org/about-3gpp> accessed 27 January 2022.
  73. Abdelkaf, Bolla, Lanting, Rodriguez-Ascaso, Thuns, Wetterwald (n 61) 8.
  74. ECORYS, Eindhoven Institute of Technology (n 66) 10.
  75. Baron, Contreras, Husovec, Larouche, Thumm (n 67) 20.
  76. Abdelkaf, Bolla, Lanting, Rodriguez-Ascaso, Thuns, Wetterwald (n 61) 15.
  77. ibid.
  78. ibid 16.
  79. ibid 161.
  80. ECORYS, Eindhoven Institute of Technology (n 66) 10.
  81. European Commission, “Standard Essential Patents” (EC undated) <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/strategy/intellectual-property/patent-protection-eu/standard-essentialpatents_ en> accessed 27 January 2022.
  82. Vincent Angwenyi, “Hold-up, Hold-out and F/Rand: The Quest for Balance” (2017) 66(2) GRUR Int 105, 106.
  83. Justus Baron and Kirti Gupta, “Unpacking 3GPP standards” (2018) 27(3) J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 433-461.
  84. European Commission (n 81).
  85. Tsilikas (n 65) 161.
  86. Ross O’Brien, “Decarbonizing industries with connectivity & 5G” (sponsored by Ericsson) Francesca Fanshawe (ed.) (MIT Technology Review Insights 2021) 7 <https://www.ericsson. com/4a98c2/assets/local/about-ericsson/sustainability-andcorporate-responsibility/environment/mit-technology-reviewdecarbonizing- industries-with-connectivity-and-5g.pdf> accessed 27 January 2022.
  87. ibid 10.
  88. ibid 13.
  89. ibid 17.
  90. European Commission, “Benefits of Standards” (EC undated) <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-standards/standardisation-policy/benefits-standards_en> accessed 27 January 2022.
  91. Tabrez Ebrahim, “Clean and sustainable technology innovation” (2020) 45 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 113.
  92. Grazia Cecere, Nicoletta Corrocher, Maria Luisa Mancusi, “Financial constraints and public funding of eco-innovation: empirical evidence from European SMEs” (2020) 54 Small Bus Econ 285, 298.
  93. Anex (n 2) 197.
  94. This heavily depends on the IPR Policy. See Carlos Muñoz Ferrandis and Claudia Tapia, “Integrating Open Source into De Jure Standardization: Beyond a Call for the Appropriate License” (2018) LIII(3) les Nouvelles - Journal of the Licensing Executives Society, available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3218558> accessed 9 May 2022.
les Nouvelles